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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The proliferation of information technology has 
affected all economic sectors, and although the 
internet has often improved the way business is 
carried out, it has increased the vulnerability of 
critical infrastructures to information security 
breaches.  
Cybercrime costs more than is often thought. It 
costs the global economy up to $450 billion every 
year (direct damage plus post-attack disruption to 
the normal course of targeted business), a figure 
higher than the market capitalization of Microsoft 
Inc. Furthermore, cyber-attacks are becoming more 
frequent, more complex and bigger. Hamilton Place 
Strategies3 reveals that in the last five years, the 
global median cost of a cyber-attack has increased 
by nearly 200 percent. From 2013 to 2015, 
cybercrime global costs quadrupled and it appears 
that there will be another quadrupling from 2015 to 
2019. Juniper research4 recently predicted that the 
rapid digitization of consumers’ lives and enterprise 
records will increase the cost of data breaches to 
$2.1 trillion globally by 2019. Nevertheless, a 
                                                          
3 Source: Hamilton Place Strategies (2015), Cybercrime costs more than you think. 
4 Source: Juniper research (2016), Cybercrime will cost businesses over $2 trillion 
by 2019. 
significant portion of cybercrime goes undetected, 
e.g. industrial espionage gaining access to 
confidential information is difficult to spot. 
Ginni Rometty, IBM Corp Chairman and CEO 
noted recently that cybercrime may be the greatest 
threat to every company in the world. Cyber risk 
represents, in fact, an enormous potential threat to 
public and private institutions because of its effects 
on organizational information systems, reputation, 
loss of stakeholders’ confidence and financial losses. 
In other words, when a firm suffers from an 
information breach, there is an immediate direct 
cost as a result but also many residual costs. 
Kaspersky Lab5 estimates that attacked enterprises 
suffer an average of 23 hours of downtime, resulting 
in an average loss of $1.4 million and that damage to 
the brand of the company results in costs that are 
7.5 times higher than the direct costs associated 
with recovering from the attack. Moreover, the 
average total of financial losses from security 
incidents at enterprises is $3.4 million. These 
numbers make it clear that a cyber-attack can have a 
disastrous impact on business. Furthermore, it is 
estimated that security incidents are growing at a 
compound annual growth rate of 66%. 
                                                          
5 Source: Kaspersky lab (2016), The true costs of a cyberattack for enterprises. 
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To this point, Sir Michael Rake, Chairman of BT 
Group, notes: “Cyber Security matters to me because 
it fundamentally impacts the day to day activities of 
almost every individual and organisation. With 
technology positively influencing the flexibility, agility 
and global reach of our day to day business, it is vital 
that we seek to protect ourselves, our customers and 
our supply chain from the loss of personal or 
sensitive information. We also need to guard against 
the theft of intellectual property, damage to our 
reputation or brand and of course financial and 
commercial losses”. 
Understanding the true impact of cyber-attacks 
on stock market returns is crucial in deciding 
investment levels in information security activities. 
Cyber risk is thus a very important topic for all 
firms, including financial institutions. Indeed, 
Ponemon Institute6 finds that in 2015 the companies 
in financial services industry experienced the 
highest annualized cost for cybercrime. With 
reference to banks, Danièle Nouy, Chair of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) Supervisory Board, 
considers cyber risk as a risk related to data 
integrity, and notes that “previously, banks dealt 
with the risk that IT system failures could hamper 
their daily operations, trigger operational losses and 
cause damage to their reputations. But in today’s 
world, cyber risk also includes cyber-attacks, the 
digital version of a classic bank robbery”. In light of 
this, in 2015, the SSM Supervisory Board performed 
a cyber-security review and set up a process to 
closely monitor significant IT incidents at banks. The 
purpose was to gain an overview of trends and 
developments in cyber risk. 
Several studies have examined the impact of 
announcements of cyber-attack on the stock market 
returns of publicly traded companies. However, 
findings are mixed: the announcements have often, 
but not always, had a significant negative impact. 
Despite its importance, to our knowledge, there is 
currently little literature (Gordon & Loeb, 2002; and 
Anderson, 2001) on the economics of information 
security. Moreover, very little literature addresses 
the issue with reference to the financial sector. How 
large are negative market returns following cyber-
attacks? And do hackers use insider information for 
personal gain?  
The purpose of this paper is to empirically 
address these questions by analysing a large sample 
of firms between 1995 and 2015. We assume that 
negative market returns vary in size according to the 
sector (financial vs. non-financial firms) and the 
nature of cyber-attack. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as 
follows. In Section 2, we present a literature review. 
In Section 3, we describe the data and methodology. 
In Section 4, we discuss the results and in Section 5, 
we provide concluding comments.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A large number of studies deal with information 
security breaches, but there is still a limited amount 
of literature related to the financial sector. Some 
authors (Garg et al., 2003; Ko & Dorantes, 2006; 
Andoh-Baidoo & Osei-Bryson, 2007; Ishiguro et al., 
                                                          
6 Source: Ponemon Institute, 2015 Cost of Cyber Crime Study. 
2007; Oates, 2001; Kannan et al., 2007; Odulaja & 
Wada, 2012; Ettredge & Richardson, 2003; Hovav & 
D'Arcy, 2003; Kundur et al., 2011; Eisenstein, 2008; 
Winn & Govern, 2009) evaluate the impact of 
cyber-attacks on the breached firms. Geers (2010) 
and Lilienthal & Ahmad (2015) examine the cyber 
risk at the national level. Gordon et al. (2003a) 
consider the issue of sharing information on 
computer systems security. Dos Santos et al. (1993) 
and Gordon and Loeb (2002) highlight the 
importance of IT investment. Brockett et al. (2012) 
and Shackelford (2009) focus on enterprise cyber 
risk management, risk mitigation and cyber risk 
insurance. 
The economic impact of cyber-attacks is hard 
to measure. An information security breach can have 
a negative economic impact, including lower sales 
revenues, higher expenses, decrease in future profits 
and dividends, worsening of reputation and 
reduction in the market value (Gordon et al., 2003b). 
However, the economic consequences can also be 
slight in the long run because firms can protect their 
main information assets, e.g. customer data or 
secret formulas. It is, therefore, possible that many 
information security breaches have an insignificant 
economic impact. Uma and Padmavathi (2013) 
outline that there is a lack of understanding of the 
different types of cyber-attacks, characteristics and 
possible results. Some types of cyber-attack are 
considered as a normal business cost for firms that 
use information technologies (Power, 2002). 
Moreover, there is a reason to believe that breached 
firms respond to cyber-attacks by making a new 
investment in information security (Campbell et al., 
2003). 
The allocate efficiency of capital markets 
depends on the extent to which capital asset prices 
fully reflect information that affects their value 
(Pettit, 1972). With this in mind, the market value 
represents the confidence that investors have in a 
firm, and measuring it is a way of calculating the 
impact of a cyber-attack. Moreover, Bener (2000) 
states that investor behaviour depends on what they 
have observed in the past. Several studies (Campbell 
et al., 2003; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Hovav & D’Arcy, 
2004) use event study methodology to estimate the 
consequences of cyber-attacks on the market value 
of breached firms. These studies also consider the 
type of breach. Campbell et al. (2003) state that the 
nature of the breach influences Cumulative 
Abnormal Return (CAR), while Cavusoglu et al. 
(2004) and Hovav and D’Arcy (2004) find that the 
nature of the attack is not a determinant of CAR. 
In general, there is a consensus that the 
announcement of a security breach leads to negative 
CAR. Campbell et al. (2003) focus on public firms 
and find a highly significant negative market 
reaction when breaches are related to unauthorized 
access to confidential data. Cavusoglu et al. (2004) 
find that breached firms lose an average of 2.1% 
market value within 2 days of the announcement. 
Acquisti et al. (2006) show that data breaches have a 
negative and statistically significant impact on a 
company’s market value on the announcement day. 
Ishiguro et al. (2007) find statistically significant 
reactions in around 10 days after the news reports 
and observe that the reaction to news reports of the 
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cyber-attacks is slower on the Japanese stock market 
than on the US market. Gordon et al. (2011) conduct 
the analysis over two distinct sub-periods and find 
that the impact of information security breaches on 
stock market returns of firms is significant. In 
particular, attacks associated with breaches of 
availability are seen to have the greatest negative 
effect on stock market returns. Some studies (Cohen, 
1997a; Cohen, 1997b; Cohen et al., 1998) present a 
list of sets of attacks, defences and effects.  
Gandhi et al. (2011) state that sometimes cyber-
attacks are politically motivated, for example, they 
are carried out by members of extremist groups who 
use cyberspace to spread propaganda or attack 
websites. But information breaches can also be non-
politically motivated and in this case, generally, the 
reason of the attack is financial. Sometimes, cyber-
attacks are motivated by socio-cultural issues. The 
attacker’s motivations are important because can 
determine the level of attack intensity (Gupta et al., 
2000). 
Anyway, firms must take a proactive attitude 
toward managing cyber-attacks, to enhance overall 
cybersecurity and help secure critical national 
infrastructure (Shackelford, 2012). Young et al. 
(2016) highlight the importance of strategies to 
minimize cyber risk and suggest some techniques to 
optimize the level of investment in cyber security 
and insurance for critical infrastructure owners and 
operators. Eling and Schnell (2016) consider the 
difficulties to insure cyber risk, especially due to 
a lack of data and modelling approaches, the risk 
of change and incalculable accumulation risks. 
The authors illustrate various ways to overcome 
these mentioned limitations, such as mandatory 
reporting requirements or pooling of data. 
To our knowledge, there is little literature on 
the economics of information security. Gordon and 
Loeb (2002) present an economic model that 
determines the optimal amount to invest to protect 
a given set of information. They suggest that to 
maximize the expected benefit from investment in 
protecting information, a firm should spend only a 
small fraction of the expected loss caused by a 
security breach. Anderson (2001) puts forward a 
new concept of information insecurity, based on 
factors including network externalities, asymmetric 
information, moral hazard and adverse selection. 
Kahn and Roberds (2008) focus on identity theft in 
credit transactions, which they call “the 
quintessential crime of the information age”, and 
model a trade-off between a desire to avoid 
costly/invasive monitoring of individuals and the 
need to control economic transactions. Cashell et al. 
(2004) point out the importance of information 
security in both public and private sectors. They 
focus on the resources used for information security 
and find that economic analysis can supply 
important information. Taplin (2016) highlights the 
importance of cyber risk for financial sector: cyber 
risk takes many forms including fraud for monetary 
gain, hacking, theft by criminals or malicious 
individuals of customer information held by 
companies, loss of key intellectual property, and the 
theft of medical data which can have a profound 
effect on the insurance sector. 
The main contribution of our paper is that it 
focuses on a longer period, 1995-2015, and presents 
a comparison between the financial and other 
sectors. Information security is a very important 
issue in the financial sector, especially in the light of 
its potential impact on reputation. For financial 
intermediaries reputation is, in fact, crucial, 
considering that the supply of payment, risk 
management services and asymmetric information 
all create systemic risk (Bhattachrya & Thakor, 1993; 
Allen & Santomero, 1997, 2001; Cummins et al., 
2006; Gillet et al., 2010). And given that today the 
banking industry has a significant online presence 
(Pennathur, 2001), cyber risk is an important 
category of banking risk. The second contribution to 
the literature is that our study considers the ‘nature’ 
of information security breaches in terms of whether 
they are confidential or non-confidential. This 
difference appears to be a determinant of whether 
and why a cyber-attack is likely to be a costly burden 
for a firm and its shareholders.  
 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Data 
 
We selected our sample from the Factiva database, 
searching for newspaper reports of global cyber-
attacks 1995-20157. We used the following 
keywords: “information security breach”, “cyber-
attack”, “computer break-in”, “computer attack”, 
“computer virus”, “computer system security”, “bank 
computer attack”, “internet security incident”, 
“denial of service attack”, “hacker”.  
We initially identified 252 information security 
breaches (i.e., events). We obtained daily stock 
market prices from the Thomson Reuters 
Datastream database, which were adjusted for 
dividends and splits. To be included in our sample, 
information on the daily stock prices of the firms 
had to be available in this database. So our final 
sample includes 226 cyber-attacks affecting 110 
firms. Of these 226 security breaches, 67 affected 34 
financial entities.  
Table 1 reports the industry distribution of the 
sample of cyber-attacks. Companies belonging to 
following sectors, Software Publishers, Electronic 
Shopping and All Other Telecommunications, 
announced the highest number of cyber-attacks; 37, 
15 and 12 respectively; the Finance and Insurance 
sector announced 67 cyber-attacks (see Appendix, 
Table A.1 and Figures A.1 and A.2). 
Table 2 shows event distribution over the 
period 1995-2015 (also see Appendix, Figure A.3). In 
the three years (2013-2015), the sample companies 
suffered from almost 30% of total cyber-attacks. In 
particular, financial companies registered over 41% 
and non-financial companies registered about 25% of 
cyber-attacks. Cybersecurity is thus becoming an 
increasingly important issue. 
                                                          
7 In line with previous literature, we chose 1995 as the beginning date because 
it coincides with the emergence of the Internet globally. 
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Table 1. Sample industry distribution of the final sample 
 
NAICS Industry description No. of firms 
221118 Other Electric Power Generation 1 
312111 Soft Drink Manufacturing 1 
316211 Rubber and Plastics Footwear Manufacturing 1 
324110 Petroleum Refineries 1 
325412 Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing 2 
325620 Toilet Preparation Manufacturing 1 
332312 Fabricated Structural Metal Manufacturing 1 
333315 Photographic and Photocopying Equipment Manufacturing 1 
334111 Electronic Computer Manufacturing 3 
334112 Computer Storage Device Manufacturing 1 
334119 Other Computer Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing 1 
334210 Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing 2 
336411 Aircraft Manufacturing 2 
336414 Guided Missile and Space Vehicle Manufacturing 1 
441228 Motorcycle, ATV, and All Other Motor Vehicle Dealers 3 
441229 All Other Motor Vehicle Dealers 2 
443120 Computer & Software Stores 1 
443142 Electronics Stores 2 
445110 Supermarket and Other Grocery (Except Convenience) Stores 1 
446110 Pharmacies & Drug Stores 1 
448140 Family Clothing Stores 2 
451120 Hobby, Toy, & Game Stores 1 
451211 Book Stores 1 
452990 All Other General Merchandise Stores 1 
453210 Office Supplies and Stationery Stores 1 
454111 Electronic Shopping 5 
481111 Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation 3 
482111 Line-Haul Railroads 1 
492110 Couriers 2 
511110 Newspaper Publishers 3 
511210 Software Publishers 5 
513322 Cellular and Other Wireless Telecommunications 2 
515210 Cable and Other Subscription Programming 1 
517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers 2 
517210 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers 1 
517919 All Other Telecommunications 4 
518210 Data Processing & Related Services 3 
519130 Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web Search Portals 1 
520000 Finance and Insurance 34 
541410 Interior Design Services 2 
541511 Custom Computer Programming Services 2 
541519 Other computer related services 1 
561311 Employment Placement Agencies 1 
561621 Security Systems Services (except Locksmiths) 1 
811213 Communication Equipment Repair and Maintenance 1 
Total 
 
110 
Notes: The table shows the sample industry distribution of the final sample following the North American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS). 
 
Table 2. Event distribution of the final sample 1995-2015 
 
Year 
Total sample Financial entities Non-Financial companies 
No of events % of the sample No of events % of the sample No of events % of the sample 
1995 2 0.88% 1 1.49% 1 0.63% 
1996 1 0.44% 0 0.00% 1 0.63% 
1997 4 1.77% 0 0.00% 4 2.52% 
1998 2 0.88% 0 0.00% 2 1.26% 
1999 17 7.52% 3 4.48% 14 8.81% 
2000 22 9.73% 2 2.99% 20 12.58% 
2001 11 4.87% 3 4.48% 8 5.03% 
2002 4 1.77% 0 0.00% 4 2.52% 
2003 10 4.42% 3 4.48% 7 4.40% 
2004 10 4.42% 2 2.99% 8 5.03% 
2005 11 4.87% 5 7.46% 6 3.77% 
2006 3 1.33% 2 2.99% 1 0.63% 
2007 10 4.42% 3 4.48% 7 4.40% 
2008 3 1.33% 0 0.00% 3 1.89% 
2009 10 4.42% 3 4.48% 7 4.40% 
2010 11 4.87% 2 2.99% 9 5.66% 
2011 13 5.75% 1 1.49% 12 7.55% 
2012 15 6.64% 9 13.43% 6 3.77% 
2013 31 13.72% 15 22.39% 16 10.06% 
2014 17 7.52% 3 4.48% 14 8.81% 
2015 19 8.41% 10 14.93% 9 5.66% 
Total 226 
 
67 
 
159 
 
Notes: The table shows the cyber-attack distribution of the final sample from 1995 to 2015. 
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3.2. Methodology 
 
Following previous studies (Campbell et al., 2003; 
Gordon et al., 2011), we run an event study to 
measure the impact of information security breaches 
on stock returns. An event study is a method used to 
measure the effects of an economic event on the 
value of firms. The null hypothesis is that the event 
has no impact on the distribution of returns.  
The event study methodology makes it possible 
to verify whether cybercriminals are involved in 
insider trading. This is important because of the 
price impact of such a trade (Meulbroek, 1992) and 
the link between the size of an illegal insider's trade 
and the value of his private information, the 
probability of detection and the expected penalty if 
detected (Frino et al., 2013). 
Event study methodology has been widely used 
in banking and finance literature (see, e.g., Brown & 
Warner, 1980). The assumption that the financial 
markets respond to news affecting the value of a 
security means that stock market returns are able to 
capture the implicit and explicit costs of cyber-
attacks (Acquisti et al., 2006; Iheagwara et al., 2004; 
Kerschbaum et al., 2002; McConnell & Muscarella, 
1985). In particular, if a firm suffers from an 
information security breach then it may incur 
financial losses, which should reflect in its stock 
price. Stock prices on the days surrounding the 
event can capture the impact of that event and 
measure the economic cost of the cyber-attack. 
Event study methodology is in fact based on a semi-
strong version of the efficient market hypothesis 
(Fama et al., 1969). 
Appraisal of the event’s impact requires a 
measure of the abnormal return (AR) that is the 
forecast error of a specific normal return-generating 
mode. Specifically, the AR is the actual ex-post 
return of the security over the event window8 minus 
the normal return of the firm over the event window. 
The normal return is defined as the expected return 
without conditioning on the event taking place. In 
other words, estimated ARs are defined as the 
company stock return obtained on a given day t, i.e. 
when the cyber-attack is announced, minus the 
predicted “normal” stock return. We estimate daily 
AR using the Sharpe (1963) market model9, which 
relates the return of any given security to the return 
of the market portfolio, as follows: 
 
R
i,t 
= α
i
 + β
i
 R
m,t 
+ ε
i,t
 (1) 
 
                                                          
8 The event window is the period over which the security prices of the firms 
involved in the event are examined. 
9 The market model is used as the normal performance return model. 
where, R
i,t
 is the stock rate of return of the 
affected company i on day t; R
m,t
 is the rate of return 
on market index on day t; α
i
 is the idiosyncratic risk 
component of share i; β
i
 is the beta coefficient of 
share i and ε
i,t 
is the random error10. The αi and β
i
 
coefficients were estimated for each company using 
an ordinary least square (OLS) regression of R
i,t
 on 
R
m,t
 for a 121-working-day estimation period (from 
the 21st to the 141st day before the cyber-attack 
announcement)11. The event window is defined as 
the time window that takes into account -τ1 days 
before and +τ2 day after the date of the 
announcement. The date of the announcement is 
defined as day zero. Following a standard approach, 
we consider various event windows with different 
lengths, with the widest lasting from 20 days before 
the announcement day to 20 days after it. Because 
our sample includes a large set of firms, we select 
the following market indexes: the S&P500 
Composite12, NASDAQ and the S&P600 Small Cap. We 
use the market index total return as our proxy of 
R
m,t
13. Using the firm-specific parameters estimated 
for the market model over the estimated period 
(MacKinlay, 1997), the AR
i,t 
is measured as follows: 
 
AR
i,t
 = R
i,t 
– (α
i
 + β
i 
R
m,t
) (2) 
 
The  average  AR  for  n  firm  shares  on  day t  
(
tAR
) of the event window is measured as follows: 
 



n
i
tit AR
n
AR
1
,
1  
(3) 
 
The concept of cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR) is necessary to accommodate a multiple 
period event window. The CAR from τ1 to τ2 is the 
sum of the included abnormal returns: 
 



2
1
,i 2) 1,( CAR



t
tiAR
 
(4) 
where, the (τ1, τ2) is the event window. The 
average CAR for the event period [CAR (τ1, τ2)] is 
measured as follows: 
 
2) 1,(
1
2) 1,( CAR
1
 


n
i
iCAR
n
 
(5) 
 
where, n is the number of events.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We test the statistical significance of CARs 
using the Boehmer et al. (1991) test statistic Z to 
                                                          
10 Specifically, i,t describes the random component of the linear relationship 
between Rm,t and Ri,t. 
11 The most common choise is using the period prior to the event window for 
the estimation window (MacKinlay, 1997). 
12 Subramani and Walden (2001) use the S&P 500 Composite index. 
13 Some studies use a set of control firms in the same industry to assess AR, 
e.g., Cooper et al. (2001). 
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capture the event-induced increase in return 
volatility as follows: 
 
)2/,0(
2)) 1,(SCAR-2) 1,(SCAR(1))-((1/(n
2) 1,(SCAR
2


ggTnZ

  
(6) 
where, n is the number of the stocks in the 
sample and SCAR (τ1, τ2) is the standardized 
abnormal return on stocks i at day t, obtained 
following the Mikkelson and Partch (1988) approach 
as follows: 
 
 
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2
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i
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

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i
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(7) 
 
where, R
m
 is the average return on market index 
in the estimation period, σ
i
 is the estimated standard 
deviation of AR on stock i, T is the number of days 
in the estimation period, T
s
 is the number of days in 
the event window and all other terms as previously 
defined. The Z test in Equation (6) has a t-
distribution with T-2 degrees of freedom and 
converges to a unit normal. 
We also carried out the following two tests. The 
first, described by Campbell et al. (1997), verifies 
whereby the event has no influence on CARs (null 
hypothesis) as follows: 
 
)1,0(
2) 1,(
2) 1,( CAR
21
NT 

  
(8) 
 
The second, called the Sign test (Peterson, 
1989; Campbell et al., 1997; MacKinlay, 1997), is a 
non-parametric test used to validate the results of 
the test Z and T
1
, as follows: 
 
)1,0(
5,0
N
5,0
N
N 1/2(-)
2 NT 






 
(9) 
 
where, N is the number of events and N(-) is the 
number of event with negative CAR. The null 
hypothesis is represented by the absence of 
significant CARs in the presence of announcements 
of cyber-attacks. The key parameter of the T
2 
is the 
median sample and the null hypothesis is rejected 
when a significant number of negative CARs are 
recorded. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Stock market reaction to cyber-attacks 
 
Focusing on the whole sample of cyber-attacks 
(Table 3), we found that the average CARs are 
negative in all event windows, showing that cyber-
attack announcements always lead to negative 
market returns for a company (the market reacts 
negatively to the announcement of cyber-attack (it is 
a negative information). The extent of negative 
market returns and the statistical significance of 
mean CARs vary according to the event windows. In 
particular, results in the symmetric event windows 
after the announcement show a high statistical 
significance, at the 90% confidence level or above. 
The event windows (-5; 5) and (-3; 3) show mean 
CARs of -1.26% and -1.19% respectively. This means 
that significant negative market returns occur on the 
days prior to and after the announcement of 
information security breaches. Moreover, the official 
announcement of a cyber-attack is often partly 
anticipated by a few days: the asymmetric event 
windows (-10; -1), (-5; -1) and (-3; -1) display a 
statistical significance at the 90% confidence level or 
above. Specifically, they show mean CARs of -1.08%, 
-0.87% and -0.90% respectively. These results imply 
that cybercriminals could be implicated in insider 
trading. Insider threats (i.e. fraud, theft of 
confidential information and intellectual property, 
sabotage of computer systems), coming from people 
within the organization, such as employees, are, in 
fact, one of the most prevalent types of cyber 
threats. Furthermore, it must be said that, in the age 
of globalization, sometimes, it is hard to pinpoint 
the first release date of an information security 
breach. Finally, negative market returns also occur 
on the days after the announcement: the event 
window (0; 20) shows a mean CAR of -1.19%, but at 
low statistical significance. 
In summary, the stock market seems to 
recognize the negative business impacts of a cyber-
attack. Effects of cyber-attacks on businesses can be 
financial, reputational and legal. Some costs are well-
known, such as customer breach notifications, post-
breach customer protection, regulatory compliance, 
attorney fees and litigation, cybersecurity 
improvements, technical investigations. Other costs 
are less visible, e.g., operational disruption, loss of 
intellectual property, lost value of customer 
relationships, devaluation of trade name increased 
cost to raise debt, insurance premium increases. 
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Table 3. Test statistics on CARs for the whole sample 
 
Event window No. of observations Mean CAR (%) Z T
1
 T
2
 % of negative CARs 
(-20; 20) 226 -3.326 -1.361* -1.634* -0.399 48.67 
(-10; 10) 226 -3.334 -2.360*** -2.190*** 0.399 51.33 
(-5; 5) 226 -1.257 -2.389*** -2.818*** 2.794*** 59.29 
(-3; 3) 226 -1.190 -2.313*** -2.987*** 2.129*** 57.08 
(-20; -1) 226 -0.991 -1.667* -1.341* 0.532 51.77 
(-10; -1) 226 -1.083 -2.681*** -2.479*** 2.395*** 57.96 
(-5; -1) 226 -0.874 -3.820*** -2.971*** 4.257*** 64.16 
(-3; -1) 226 -0.900 -3.429*** -3.718*** 3.991*** 63.27 
(0; 20) 226 -1.194 -1.841** -1.599* 0.931 53.10 
(0; 10) 226 -2.251 -0.970 -1.754** -0.266 49.12 
(0; 5) 226 -0.382 0.183 -1.041 -0.133 49.56 
(0; 3) 226 -0.290 -0.143 -0.885 -0.798 47.35 
(0; 1) 226 -0.238 0.357 -0.855 -2.661 41.15 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the event study carried out on the data for 226 cases of cyber-attacks announced by 110 
listed companies between 1995 and 2015. We measured the companies’ normal return as reported in Equation (1). The abnormal 
return (Ari,t) was calculated as reported in Equation (2). The CAR statistical significance was assessed using the parametric tests Z and 
T
1
 reported in Equations (6) and (8) and the non-parametric test T
2
 reported in Equation (9). 
 * Statistically significant at 10% (one-tailed test) 
 ** Statistically significant at 5% (one-tailed test) 
 *** Statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed test) 
 
We classify the sample according to the 
economic sector of the firms. In particular, we 
analyse the potential differences between the 
financial and other sectors. Of course, the financial 
sector is one of the industries that are most at risk, 
given the nature of the data that it holds. Moreover, 
the risk has evolved from financial theft and fraud 
to more complex consequences like theft of 
intellectual property, business disruption and 
reputation damage. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results. We found 
that the average CARs are negative in all event 
windows, showing that cyber-attack announcements 
lead to negative market returns for both financial 
and non-financial companies. Moreover, the official 
announcement of information security breach is 
partly anticipated by a few days. With reference to 
the financial sector, the event windows (-10; -1), (-5; -
1) and (-3; -1) display a high statistical significance 
and show mean CARs of -2.04%, -0.91% and -0.80% 
respectively. For the other sectors, the event 
windows (-10; -1), (-5; -1) and (-3; -1) display a high 
statistical significance and show mean CARs of -
0.68%, -0.86% and -0.94% respectively. Again, it could 
be possible that a link exists between cybercrime 
and insider trading. 
The other sectors also register statistical 
significant mean CARs in the event windows (-5; 5) 
and (-3; 3), - 1.18% and -1.22% respectively. 
In general, financial entities show a greater 
negative effect in the event windows before the 
cyber-attack announcements. 
 
Table 4. Test statistics on CARs for financial entities 
 
Event window No. of observations Mean CAR (%) Z T
1
 T
2
 % of negative CARs 
(-20; 20) 67 -3.423 -1.389* -2.544*** 0.122 50.75 
(-10; 10) 67 -3.107 -2.323*** -3.373*** 1.100 56.72 
(-5; 5) 67 -1.446 -1.640* -2.700*** 1.100 56.72 
(-3; 3) 67 -1.121 -1.730** -2.648*** 1.100 56.72 
(-20; -1) 67 -2.111 -0.841 -2.418*** 0.367 52.24 
(-10; -1) 67 -2.041 -2.582*** -3.435*** 2.321*** 64.18 
(-5; -1) 67 -0.910 -1.477* -2.743*** 2.321*** 64.18 
(-3; -1) 67 -0.797 -1.726** -3.310*** 2.077*** 62.69 
(0; 20) 67 -2.154 -0.764 -2.276*** 0.855 55.22 
(0; 10) 67 -1.067 -0.925 -1.752** 0.611 53.73 
(0; 5) 67 -0.536 -0.248 -1.291* 0.122 50.75 
(0; 3) 67 -0.324 0.014 -0.790 -0.122 49.25 
(0; 1) 67 -0.165 0.737 -0.441 -0.367 47.76 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the event study carried out on the data for 67 cases of cyber-attacks announced by 34 
listed financial companies between 1995 and 2015. We measured the companies’ normal return as reported in Equation (1). The 
abnormal return (AR
i,t
) was calculated as reported in Equation (2). The CAR statistical significance was assessed using the parametric 
tests Z and T
1
 reported in Equations (6) and (8) and the non-parametric test T
2
 reported in Equation (9). 
 * Statistically significant at 10% (one-tailed test) 
 ** Statistically significant at 5% (one-tailed test) 
 *** Statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed test 
 
4.2. Confidential and non-confidential cyber-attacks: 
the whole sample 
 
Next, we present our results by grouping 
information security breaches according to whether 
the attack is confidential (75 events) or non-
confidential (151 events). We consider a cyber-attack 
as confidential where unauthorized access to 
confidential information occurs, and non-
confidential when it is a computer virus or worm, a 
DOS attack or system breakdown.  
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Table 5. Test statistics on CARs for non-financial entities 
 
Event window No. of observations Mean CAR (%) Z T
1
 T
2
 % of negative CARs 
(-20; 20) 159 -3.284 -0.687 -1.158 -0.872 46.54 
(-10; 10) 159 -3.430 -1.326* -1.611* 0.079 50.31 
(-5; 5) 159 -1.177 -1.826** -1.987** 2.776*** 61.01 
(-3; 3) 159 -1.219 -1.723** -2.268*** 1.824** 57.23 
(-20; -1) 159 -0.520 -1.442* -0.529 0.555 52.20 
(-10; -1) 159 -0.679 -2.058*** -1.202* 1.348* 55.35 
(-5; -1) 159 -0.859 -3.537*** -2.179*** 3.410*** 63.52 
(-3; -1) 159 -0.943 -3.051*** -2.869*** 3.727*** 64.78 
(0; 20) 159 -0.790 -1.705** -0.804 0.714 52.83 
(0; 10) 159 -2.750 -0.565 -1.524* -0.714 47.17 
(0; 5) 159 -0.317 0.315 -0.646 0.079 50.31 
(0; 3) 159 -0.276 -0.183 -0.637 -0.714 47.17 
(0; 1) 159 -0.268 -1.624 -0.741 -0.714 47.17 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the event study carried out on the data for 159 cases of cyber-attacks announced by 76 
listed financial companies between 1995 and 2015. We measured the companies’ normal return as reported in Equation (1). The 
abnormal return (AR
i,t
) was calculated as reported in Equation (2). The CAR statistical significance was assessed using the parametric 
tests Z and T
1
 reported in Equations (6) and (8) and the non-parametric test T
2
 reported in Equation (9). 
 * Statistically significant at 10% (one-tailed test) 
 ** Statistically significant at 5% (one-tailed test) 
 *** Statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed test 
 
First, we analyse the whole sample. Regarding 
confidential attacks (Table 6), we found that all 
mean CARs are negative [except for the event 
windows (-5; 5), (0; 5) and (0; 3)] but their size is 
generally small and they are not statistically 
significant (i.e. they are below the 90% confidence 
level), except for the event windows (-10; -1) and (-5; 
-1). The event window (-10; -1) shows mean CARs of -
0.17% but it is not completely reliable because the 
result passes only the parametric Z test. The event 
window (-5; -1) shows mean CARs of -0.18%. 
Regarding non-confidential attacks (Table 7), we 
found that all mean CARs are negative and higher in 
symmetric event windows, ranging from -1.68% to -
4.71%, and with a confidence level of 90% or more. 
The event windows (-10; -1), (-5; -1) and (-3; -1) also 
display a high statistical significance and show mean 
CARs of -1.53%, -1.22% and -1.18% respectively. This 
means that investors are able to forecast non-
confidential cyber-attacks. 
 
Table 6. Test statistics on CARs for sub-sample of confidential attacks for the whole sample 
 
Event window No. of observations Mean CAR (%) Z T
1
 T
2
 % of negative CARs 
(-20; 20) 75 -0.153 0.330 -0.084 -1.270 42.67 
(-10; 10) 75 -0.565 -0.010 -0.396 -1.039 44.00 
(-5; 5) 75 0.040 -0.241 0.065 0.577 53.33 
(-3; 3) 75 -0.210 0.039 -0.398 0.115 50.67 
(-20; -1) 75 -0.552 -1.015 -0.729 -0.346 48.00 
(-10; -1) 75 -0.173 -1.364* -0.262 1.039 56.00 
(-5; -1) 75 -0.183 -1.348* -0.479 1.963** 61.33 
(-3; -1) 75 -0.327 -0.922 -1.195 1.501** 58.67 
(0; 20) 75 -0.743 -1.027 -0.924 0.115 50.67 
(0; 10) 75 -0.391 0.872 -0.315 -1.039 50.67 
(0; 5) 75 0.223 0.693 0.413 -1.039 44.00 
(0; 3) 75 0.116 0.864 0.240 -1.501 44.00 
(0; 1) 75 -0.058 0.751 -0.137 -2.194*** 37.33 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the event study carried out on the data for 75 cases of confidential cyber-attacks 
announced by 51 listed companies between 1995 and 2015. We measured the companies’ normal return as reported in Equation (1).  
The abnormal return (AR
i,t
) was calculated as reported in Equation (2). The CAR statistical significance was assessed using the 
parametric tests Z and T
1
 reported in Equations (6) and (8) and the non-parametric test T
2
 reported in Equation (9). 
 * Statistically significant at 10% (one-tailed test) 
 ** Statistically significant at 5% (one-tailed test) 
 *** Statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed test) 
 
Table 7. Test statistics on CARs for sub-sample of non-confidential attacks for the whole sample 
 
Event window No. of observations Mean CAR (%) Z T
1
 T
2
 % of negative CARs 
(-20; 20) 151 -4.901 -1.809** -1.691* 0.407 51.66 
(-10; 10) 151 -4.710 -2.839*** -2.183*** 1.546* 56.29 
(-5; 5) 151 -1.901 -2.699*** -3.248*** 3.174*** 62.91 
(-3; 3) 151 -1.676 -2.928*** -3.158*** 2.523*** 60.26 
(-20; -1) 151 -1.210 -1.328* -1.163 0.895 53.64 
(-10; -1) 151 -1.535 -2.384*** -2.735*** 2.360*** 59.60 
(-5; -1) 151 -1.218 -3.619*** -3.087*** 3.988*** 66.23 
(-3; -1) 151 -1.184 -3.355*** -3.552*** 4.313*** 67.55 
(0; 20) 151 -1.419 -1.528* -1.359* 1.383* 55.63 
(0; 10) 151 -3.175 -1.747** -1.750** 0.407 51.66 
(0; 5) 151 -0.683 -0.227 -1.430* 0.895 53.64 
(0; 3) 151 -0.492 -0.641 -1.153 0.244 50.99 
(0; 1) 151 -0.327 -1.033 -0.911 0.570 52.32 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the event study carried out on the data for 151 cases of non-confidential cyber-attacks 
announced by 86 listed companies between 1995 and 2015. We measured the companies’ normal return as reported in Equation (1).  
The abnormal return (AR
i,t
) was calculated as reported in Equation (2). The CAR statistical significance was assessed using the 
parametric tests Z and T
1
 reported in Equations (6) and (8) and the non-parametric test T
2
 reported in Equation (9). 
 * Statistically significant at 10% (one-tailed test) 
 ** Statistically significant at 5% (one-tailed test) 
 *** Statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed test) 
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4.3. Confidential and non-confidential cyber-attacks: 
financial vs non-financial sector 
 
We also measured the effects on market returns of 
confidential and non-confidential attacks 
distinguishing between financial entities and non-
financial companies. In the case of confidential 
attacks announced by financial entities (Table 8), we 
found no statistically significant results. In the 
financial industry, confidential attack 
announcements are likely to be predicted by 
investors because unauthorized access to 
confidential information is a big concern, and word 
of mouth is likely to spread fast.  
Non-confidential attacks announced by 
financial entities (Table 9) appear to generate greater 
negative market returns than confidential attacks. 
The most significant results were found in the 
symmetric event windows (-10; 10), (-5; 5) and (-3; 3), 
showing statistically significant CARs of -4.03%,         
-1.92% and -1.46%, respectively. Statistical significant 
negative market returns are also associated with the 
event windows (-10; -1), (-5; -1) and (-3; -1), with 
values of -2.63%, -1.34% and -1%, respectively. 
Interestingly, non-confidential attacks in the 
financial system are more dangerous than 
confidential attacks. This may signal that the stock 
markets are more efficient when cyber-attacks do 
not concern access to confidential information. In 
general, non-confidential attacks determine larger 
negative returns than the confidential ones, so it 
may be the case that investors perceive financial 
entities damaged by non-confidential attacks as 
being more vulnerable. In fact, as well as protecting 
data, such as customer records, trading information, 
and confidential documents, banks and other 
financial service organizations have to safeguard 
their systems and networks as well as their financial 
assets. This means the financial sector faces a larger 
number of threats than many other industries. 
 
Table 8. Test statistics on CARs for sub-sample of confidential attacks for financial entities 
 
Event window No. of observations Mean CAR (%) Z T
1
 T
2
 % of negative CARs 
(-20; 20) 23 -1.232 -0.067 -0.652 -0.209 47.83 
(-10; 10) 23 -1.338 -0.752 -0.974 -0.209 47.83 
(-5; 5) 23 -0.540 0.129 -0.718 -0.209 47.83 
(-3; 3) 23 -0.465 0.332 -0.554 -0.626 43.48 
(-20; -1) 23 -1.116 0.050 -0.773 -0.209 47.83 
(-10; -1) 23 -0.922 -0.079 -0.984 0.626 56.52 
(-5; -1) 23 -0.090 0.529 -0.199 0.209 52.17 
(-3; -1) 23 -0.407 -0.010 -0.876 -0.209 47.83 
(0; 20) 23 -1.309 0.117 -0.801 0.209 52.17 
(0; 10) 23 -0.416 -0.361 -0.528 -0.209 47.83 
(0; 5) 23 -0.450 0.009 -0.082 -0.209 47.83 
(0; 3) 23 -0.058 0.958 -0.082 -0.626 43.48 
(0; 1) 23 -0.326 1.026 -0.483 -1.043 39.13 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the event study carried out on the data for 23 cases of confidential cyber-attacks 
announced by 15 listed financial companies between 1995 and 2015. We measured the companies’ normal return as reported in 
Equation (1). The abnormal return (AR
i,t
) was calculated as reported in Equation (2). The CAR statistical significance was assessed using 
the parametric tests Z and T
1
 reported in Equations (6) and (8) and the non-parametric test T
2
 reported in Equation (9). 
 * Statistically significant at 10% (one-tailed test) 
 ** Statistically significant at 5% (one-tailed test) 
 *** Statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed test 
 
Table 9. Test statistics on CARs for sub-sample of non-confidential attacks for financial entities 
 
Event window No. of observations Mean CAR (%) Z T
1
 T
2
 % of negative CARs 
(-20; 20) 44 -4.569 -1.539* -2.579*** 0.905 56.82 
(-10; 10) 44 -4.032 -2.250*** -3.412*** 1.508* 61.36 
(-5; 5) 44 -1.920 -1.978** -2.727*** 1.508* 61.36 
(-3; 3) 44 -1.464 -2.392*** -3.153*** 1.809** 63.64 
(-20; -1) 44 -2.631 -1.042 -2.422*** 0.603 54.55 
(-10; -1) 44 -2.626 -3.114*** -3.522*** 2.714*** 70.45 
(-5; -1) 44 -1.339 -2.583*** -3.091*** 2.714*** 70.45 
(-3; -1) 44 -1.001 -1.847** -3.710*** 2.714*** 70.45 
(0; 20) 44 -2.596 -0.968 -2.248*** 0.905 56.82 
(0; 10) 44 -1.407 -0.856 -1.703** 0.905 56.82 
(0; 5) 44 -0.581 -0.285 -1.102 0.302 52.27 
(0; 3) 44 -0.462 -0.418 -0.922 0.302 52.27 
(0; 1) 44 -0.081 -0.625 -0.180 0.302 52.27 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the event study carried out on the data for 44 cases of non-confidential cyber-attacks 
announced by 26 listed financial companies between 1995 and 2015. We measured the companies’ normal return as reported in 
Equation (1). The abnormal return (AR
i,t
) was calculated as reported in Equation (2). The CAR statistical significance was assessed using 
the parametric tests Z and T
1
 reported in Equations (6) and (8) and the non-parametric test T
2
 reported in Equation (9). 
 * Statistically significant at 10% (one-tailed test) 
 ** Statistically significant at 5% (one-tailed test) 
 *** Statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed test 
 
Focusing on confidential attacks announced by 
non-financial companies (Table 10), we found no 
statistically significant results except for the event 
window (-5; -1). Again, we found that confidential 
attack announcements are likely to be forecast by 
investors. Regarding non-confidential attacks 
announced by non-financial companies (Table 11), 
CARs are negative and statistically significant at        
-1.89% and -1.76% for the event windows (-5; 5) and    
(-3; 3), respectively. Statistically significant negative 
market returns are also associated with the event 
windows (-5; -1) and (-3; -1), with values of -1.17%, 
and -1.26%, respectively.  
Finally, we found that non-confidential attacks 
are more dangerous than confidential attacks for 
both financial and non-financial sectors but, in 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 15, Issue 2, Winter 2018 
 
79 
general, the negative effects on the financial sector 
are greater than on other sectors. Most mean CARs 
values are statistically significant and higher than 
values in other sectors. 
 
Table 10. Test statistics on CARs for sub-sample of confidential attacks for other sectors 
 
Event window No. of observations Mean CAR (%) Z T
1
 T
2
 % of negative CARs 
(-20; 20) 52 0.324 0.422 0.130 -1.387* 40.38 
(-10; 10) 52 -0.223 0.377 -0.113 -1.109 42.31 
(-5; 5) 52 0.297 -0.329 0.360 0.832 55.77 
(-3; 3) 52 -0.098 -0.112 -0.147 0.555 53.85 
(-20; -1) 52 -0.302 -1.254* -0.342 -0.277 48.08 
(-10; -1) 52 0.158 -1.518* 0.184 0.832 55.77 
(-5; -1) 52 -0.224 -2.102*** -0.436 2.219*** 65.38 
(-3; -1) 52 -0.291 -1.111 -0.866 0.832 63.46 
(0; 20) 52 -0.493 -1.297* -0.545 0.000 50.00 
(0; 10) 52 -0.380 1.174 -0.217 -1.109 42.31 
(0; 5) 52 0.521 0.740 0.727 -1.109 42.31 
(0; 3) 52 0.193 0.462 0.309 -1.387* 40.38 
(0; 1) 52 0.061 -1.041 0.115 -1.941** 36.54 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the event study carried out on the data for 52 cases of confidential cyber-attacks 
announced by 36 listed companies between 1995 and 2015. We measured the companies’ normal return as reported in Equation (1). 
The abnormal return (AR
i,t
) was calculated as reported in Equation (2). The CAR statistical significance was assessed using the 
parametric tests Z and T
1
 reported in Equations (6) and (8) and the non-parametric test T
2
 reported in Equation (9). 
* Statistically significant at 10% (one-tailed test) 
** Statistically significant at 5% (one-tailed test) 
*** Statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed test 
 
Table 11. Test statistics on CARs for sub-sample of non-confidential attacks for other sectors 
 
Event window No. of observations Mean CAR (%) Z T
1
 T
2
 % of negative CARs 
(-20; 20) 107 -5.038 -1.111 -1.252* -0.097 49.53 
(-10; 10) 107 -4.988 -1.907** -1.660** 0.870 54.21 
(-5; 5) 107 -1.893 -1.982** -2.447*** 2.804*** 63.55 
(-3; 3) 107 -1.764 -2.080*** -2.435*** 1.837*** 58.88 
(-20; -1) 107 -0.626 -0.908 -0.449 0.870 54.21 
(-10; -1) 107 -1.086 -1.706** -1.497* 0.870 54.21 
(-5; -1) 107 -1.168 -2.958*** -2.214*** 2.997*** 64.49 
(-3; -1) 107 -1.260 -2.862*** -2.756*** 3.384*** 66.36 
(0; 20) 107 -0.935 -1.189 -0.672 1.063 55.14 
(0; 10) 107 -3.902 -1.532** -1.539** -0.097 49.53 
(0; 5) 107 -0.725 -0.113 -1.136 0.870 54.21 
(0; 3) 107 -0.504 -0.489 -0.891 -0.097 49.53 
(0; 1) 107 -0,428 -1.942** -0.908 0.483 52.34 
Notes:  The table reports the results of the event study carried out on the data for 107 cases of non-confidential cyber-attacks 
announced by 58 listed companies between 1995 and 2015. We measured the companies’ normal return as reported in Equation (1).  
The abnormal return (AR
i,t
) was calculated as reported in Equation (2). The CAR statistical significance was assessed using the 
parametric tests Z and T
1
 reported in Equations (6) and (8) and the non-parametric test T
2
 reported in Equation (9). 
* Statistically significant at 10% (one-tailed test) 
** Statistically significant at 5% (one-tailed test) 
*** Statistically significant at 1% (one-tailed test 
 
In conclusion, it is important to manage the 
cyber risk and try to minimise the impact of 
information security breaches on business. After an 
attack happens, an effective cybersecurity incident 
response is necessary.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
The Internet is an important driver of economic 
development, but dependence on cyberspace has 
increased the vulnerability of critical infrastructures 
to information security breaches.  
In this paper, we study the effects on market 
returns of the announcement of information 
security breaches for listed companies. Our sample 
includes 226 cases of information security breach 
suffered by 110 companies in the period 1995-2015. 
Of these 226 cyber-attacks, 67 affected 34 financial 
entities. 
We find evidence of an overall negative stock 
market reaction to public announcements of 
information security breaches. In the financial 
sector, we find more negative market returns than 
other sectors in the event windows before the cyber 
risk announcements, especially in asymmetric event 
windows (-10; -1) and (-5; -1). This may imply that 
cybercriminals are involved in insider trading. Non-
financial companies also show statistical mean CARs 
in two event windows, (-5; 5) and (-3; 3), after the 
announcement. Considering the confidential or non-
confidential nature of cyber-attacks, we find that in 
general, non-confidential attacks (computer viruses 
and worms, DOS attacks and system breakdowns) 
are more dangerous in both financial and non-
financial sectors. Moreover, financial entities show 
greater negative effects on market returns than 
companies belonging to other economic sectors. 
Most mean CARs in the financial sector are 
statistically significant and higher than in other 
sectors. This is not surprising given that beyond 
protecting data, banks and other financial entities 
also have the challenge of safeguarding their 
systems and networks as well as the financial assets 
they hold.  
Our results have the following implications. 
Given that cyber-attacks determine negative, often 
very big, falls in market returns, it is extremely 
important that boards, especially of financial 
institutions (Brogi, 2011), consider this kind of risk.  
Cybercrime also damages the company’s 
reputation. Customers lose faith in businesses if 
their personal information and transactions are not 
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secure. Cybercrime damages trade, competitiveness, 
and innovation. Furthermore, some attributes of 
cyber risk exacerbate negative consequences. Cyber 
risk is an intangible peril: victims often only become 
aware that they have been targeted a long time after 
the attack. Cyber risk has a dynamic nature: 
information security breaches are often treated as 
an information technology problem, but they 
originate with human actors who anticipate 
defenders’ actions. Finally, cyber risk can determine 
a systemic exposure: digital technologies form 
connections that can be exploited by attackers to 
generate widespread impacts. Consequently, all 
companies, especially financial ones, need to equip 
themselves with efficient control systems (Brogi, 
2009), and to do this at an optimal level of 
investment, they need to understand the true 
negative impact of information insecurity. Second, 
we found that cybercrime may be linked to insider 
trading. It follows that financial authorities need to 
strengthen cybersecurity measures. Information 
systems should be monitored, background checks 
should be periodically conducted and warnings 
should not be ignored. We show that the negative 
effect on market returns differ according to the 
nature of the event (confidential/non-confidential) 
and the sector of the company (financial/non-
financial). After an attack occurs, an effective 
cybersecurity incident response is necessary. It can 
help to invest in training, education and awareness 
in the organisation on an on-going basis. Companies 
should create an action plan to manage cybercrime. 
But all companies, especially financial ones, need to 
prevent cyber-attacks and define levels of priority of 
different types of threat. Companies should budget 
money for repairs, reimbursement, and for future 
protection (Source: FBI (2016), https://www.fbi.gov/ 
investigate/cyber) and insurance. Finally, they have 
to implement an effective risk management policy to 
ensure that investments in cybersecurity reflect the 
considerable and progressively increasing 
underlying risk. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. The types of cyber-attack announced by the sampled companies from 1995 to 2015 
 
NAICS Industry description 
Type of attack 
 
Unauthorized access 
to confidential 
information 
Computer 
virus and 
worm 
DOS 
attack 
System 
breakdown 
Total 
221118 Other Electric Power Generation 
 
1 
  
1 
312111 Soft Drink Manufacturing 
   
1 1 
316211 Rubber and Plastics Footwear Manufacturing 1 
   
1 
324110 Petroleum Refineries 
 
1 
  
1 
325412 Pharmaceutical Preparation Manufacturing 
 
1 
 
1 2 
325620 Toilet Preparation Manufacturing 
 
1 
  
1 
332312 Fabricated Structural Metal Manufacturing 1 
   
1 
333315 
Photographic and Photocopying Equipment 
Manufacturing   
1 
 
1 
334111 Electronic Computer Manufacturing 
 
1 
 
3 4 
334112 Computer Storage Device Manufacturing 1 
   
1 
334119 
Other Computer Peripheral Equipment 
Manufacturing  
1 
  
1 
334210 Telephone Apparatus Manufacturing 3 
   
3 
336411 Aircraft Manufacturing 2 3 
  
5 
336414 
Guided Missile and Space Vehicle 
Manufacturing 
1 2 
 
1 4 
441228 
Motorcycle, ATV, and All Other Motor Vehicle 
Dealers 
2 1 
  
3 
441229 All Other Motor Vehicle Dealers 
 
2 
  
2 
443120 Computer & Software Stores 
 
2 
 
1 3 
443142 Electronic Stores 
  
2 
 
2 
445110 
Supermarkets and Other Grocery (Except 
Convenience) Stores   
1 
 
1 
446110 Pharmacies & Drug Stores 1 
   
1 
448140 Family Clothing Stores 3 
   
3 
451120 Hobby, Toy, & Game Stores 1 
   
1 
451211 Book Stores 
 
1 
  
1 
452990 All Other General Merchandise Stores 1 
   
1 
453210 Office Supplies and Stationery Stores 1 
   
1 
454111 Electronic Shopping 7 1 3 4 15 
481111 Scheduled Passenger Air Transportation 2 1 
  
3 
482111 Line-Haul Railroads 
 
1 
  
1 
492110 Couriers 
 
2 
  
2 
511110 Newspaper Publishers 1 2 1 2 6 
511210 Software Publishers 7 9 6 15 37 
513322 
Cellular and Other Wireless 
Telecommunications 
3 4 1 
 
8 
515210 Cable and Other Subscription Programming 1 
   
1 
517110 Wired Telecommunications Carriers 
 
1 1 1 3 
517210 Wireless Telecommunications Carriers 1 1 
  
2 
517919 All Other Telecommunications 5 4 1 2 12 
518210 Data Processing & Related Svcs 2 1 2 5 10 
519130 
Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web 
Search Portals   
1 
 
1 
520000 Finance and Insurance 23 10 22 12 67 
541410 Interior Design Services 2 2 
  
4 
541511 Custom Computer Programming Services 1 2 1 
 
4 
541519 Other Computer Related Services 
 
1 
  
1 
561311 Employment Placement Agencies 1 
   
1 
561621 Security Systems Services (except Locksmiths) 1 
   
1 
811213 
Communication Equipment Repair and 
Maintenance    
1 1 
Total 75 59 43 49 226 
Notes: The table shows the composition of the cyber-attacks in our sample (i.e. types of cyber-attack announced by the sampled 
companies from 1995 to 2015). Unauthorized accesses to confidential information are confidential attacks and computer viruses and 
worms, DOS attacks and system breakdowns are non-confidential attacks. 
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Figure A.1. Composition of the cyber-attacks announced by the sampled companies from 1995 to 2015 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the composition of the cyber-attacks in our sample from 1995 to 2015. 33% of attacks are unauthorized 
accesses to confidential information, 26% are computer viruses and worms, 22% are system breakdowns and 19% are DOS attacks. 
 
Figure A.2. Composition of cyber-attacks announced by the financial and non-financial companies from 1995 
to 2015 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the composition of the cyber-attacks in our sample from 1995 to 2015. For the financial entities, 34% of 
attacks are unauthorized accesses to confidential information, 33% are system breakdowns, 18% are DOS attacks and 15% are 
computer viruses and worms. For the non-financial entities, 33% of attacks are unauthorized accesses to confidential information, 31% 
are computer viruses and worms, 23% are DOS attacks and 13% are system breakdowns. 
 
Figure A.3. Event distribution of the final sample 1995-2015 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the cyber-attacks in our sample from 1995 to 2015.  
